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ABSTRACT 
 A growing body of evidence indicates that positive contact with outgroups 
improves attitudes towards those outgroups.  Unfortunately, those with the most negative 
attitudes towards outgroups often have the fewest opportunities to meaningfully interact 
with members of those groups.  These studies investigate the effects of imagining 
intergroup contact with a Muslim person on measures of explicit (Studies 1 and 2) and 
implicit (Study 2) anti-Muslim prejudice among the most ideologically intolerant 
individuals.  Local and national participants were asked to complete a short imaginative 
exercise followed by a brief online questionnaire.  Results indicate that imagined 
intergroup contact was effective in improving attitudes towards Muslims, even among 
those who were the most prejudiced and ideologically intolerant.  We discuss the 
implications of these findings, as well as potential applications for imagined intergroup 
contact interventions, including international relations/diplomacy, and classroom 
diversity initiatives.
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"Imagination is more important than knowledge.  Knowledge is limited.  Imagination 
encircles the world." – Albert Einstein 
 
 
“A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses.  It’s an idea that possesses the mind.” 
—Robert Oxton Bolton 
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 Promoting peaceful coexistence between different social groups may be one of 
the most important social issues of our time (Crisp & Turner, 2009); however, as a 
society, we don’t seem to be very good at it.  Indeed, in today’s modernized, globalized, 
civilized, and nuclearized world, the notion of “world peace” has become something of a 
cliché, relegated to beauty pageants and campaign speeches.  Nevertheless, the world 
today is interconnected like never before as thoughts, beliefs, opinions, and calls to action 
tear across the globe at the speed of light.  Now, with ethnic and religious tensions 
reaching a critical mass, and an impending clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993) 
looming just over the horizon, it is more important than ever for policymakers and 
educators to come equipped with practical and effective means for fostering tolerance and 
compassion. 
Contact Theory 
In 1954, Gordon Allport theorized that prejudice, which he defined as “feeling 
favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual 
experience” (p. 6), could be reduced through contact between members of opposing 
groups if participants (a) were of equal social status, (b) cooperatively interacted, (c) 
shared common goals, and (d) enjoyed institutional or social support (Allport, 1954).  
This notion, known now as the Contact Hypothesis, generated an explosion of interest 
and a wealth of supporting research, making it one of the most studied theories in 
psychology today (Oskamp & Jones, 2000).  Since then, contact theory has proven 
effective in improving attitudes toward a wide range of outgroups, including the elderly 
(Caspi, 1984), homosexuals (Hodson, 2009), and AIDS victims (Batson et al., 1997), to 
name just a few.  Equally diverse are the mechanisms thought to mediate contact’s 
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prejudice-reducing effects:  cognitive dissonance (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997; Miller & 
Brewer, 1986), anxiety reduction (Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Turner, Crisp, & Lambert, 
2007), functional relations (Sherif et al., 1961), empathy enhancement (Batson et al., 
1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000), and reduced stereotyping (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, 
Hermsen, & Russin, 2000).  Despite this wealth of empirical support, a number of 
practical limitations remain—most notably, issues of opportunity and efficacy. 
Prejudice, Religion, and Politics 
One of the most obvious drawbacks to using contact as an intervention is that all 
too often there are few, if any, opportunities for members of relevant racial, ethnic, or 
religious groups to interact (Dovidio et al., 2011).  This challenge is particularly 
pronounced among ideologically intolerant, highly prejudiced individuals (Allport, 1954; 
Amir, 1969).  Unfortunately, religion is both highly correlated with measures of 
ideological intolerance (Genia, 1996), and pervasive in American society:  85-90% of 
Americans report believing in God, nine out of ten report being religiously affiliated—
80% of which identify as Christian—and nearly 40% attend church once a week or more 
(Bader et al., 2005; Dougherty, Johnson, & Poulson, 2007).  Despite these already 
staggering numbers however, American theism appears to be on the rise:  according to a 
recent Pew Forum poll, Americans’ self-reported belief in God has increased from 85-
90% in 2005, to 92% in 2007 (Lugo et al., 2008). 
These relationships between intergroup attitudes, intergroup contact, ideological 
intolerance, and religion don’t just play out in temples and churches, either; as Ronald 
Reagan astutely pointed out, Americans often bring their religion with them to the polls 
(Reagan, 1984).  Indeed, examining the effects of church attendance on attitudes towards 
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same-sex marriage, Lugo et al. (2006) found that churchgoing frequency predicts 
opposition to same-sex marriage:  82% of those who attend church weekly were opposed, 
compared to only 45% who seldom or never attend.  Unsurprisingly, frequency of 
attendance has also been identified as a strong predictor of conservative ideologies; in 
fact, according to the Baylor Religion Survey (Bader et al., 2005), frequency of 
attendance was significantly and positively correlated with every measured item from the 
Conservative Agenda (“Spend more on the military,” “Advocate Christian values,” 
“Punish criminals more harshly,” “Fund faith-based organizations,” and “Allow prayer in 
schools”) and significantly and negatively correlated with four of five measured items 
from the Liberal Agenda (“Abolish the death penalty,” “Distribute wealth more evenly,” 
“Regulate business more closely,” and “Protect the environment more”). 
Indeed, Americans’ religious prejudices are reflected quite clearly in their voting 
habits as well:  according to a 2008 Gallup poll, 53% of Americans surveyed reported 
being unwilling to vote for a generally well qualified presidential candidate, nominated 
by their own party, if that candidate also happened to be an Atheist; 43% felt the same 
way about voting for a homosexual.  Other deal breakers were third spouses (30%), 
Mormon faith (24%), and being a woman (11%) (Jones, 2008).  Though prejudice against 
homosexuals and women has decline substantially in recent years, with unwilling rates 
dropping to 32% and 6% respectively, religious prejudices in the voting booth have gone 
unchanged as unwilling rates for Atheists and Mormons remained static at 49% and 22% 
respectively (Saad, 2011). 
Clearly, there is something unique about the relationship between religion and 
prejudice.  Moreover, there seems to be something unique about religion in general, given 
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its remarkable ubiquity:  “Any characteristic that is this common in a species cries out for 
explanation.  Why do so many people believe in God?” (Shermer, 2011, p. 165).  The 
answer, ironically, appears to be evolution, and it may also explain why religion is so 
closely related to intergroup prejudice. 
The Origins of Religion 
Prior to the development of religion, large-scale group cooperation was severely 
limited.  Though the payoff for such cooperation can certainly be substantial, it requires 
considerable self-sacrifice from each individual.  Unfortunately, the tendency to free 
ride—that is, to reap the benefits of group cooperation without actually contributing to 
the effort—is practically irresistible given the tremendous fitness advantages one can 
gain from cheating the system (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011).  Methods for 
deterring and discriminating against untrustworthy free riders were thus essential for 
large groups to develop and operate successfully.  
Formally and harshly punishing transgressors is an effective method of 
deterrence, if done in a reliable and consistent manner; however, monitoring and 
punishing free riders is itself a costly endeavor, and once a majority of the population is 
genuinely honest, monitoring for honesty becomes a waste of time (Gervais et al., 2011; 
Irons, 1996; Johnson & Bering, 2006).  Instead, not monitoring becomes advantageous, 
leading to the development of a second-order level of free riding where the problem 
begins anew:  some individuals contribute to the public good, but skip out on 
administering punishment (Irons, 1996; Johnson & Bering, 2006).   
While third-party punishment administrators such as court systems and police 
forces are popular solutions for enforcing social norms today, Henrich and Boyd (2001) 
 5 
point out that large-scale group cooperation existed long before such institutions 
developed.  Nevertheless, recent investigations into the evolutionary origins of altruism 
and group cooperation suggest that punishment may have been outsourced after all.  
Indeed, emerging evidence from a number of disciplines supports the notion that the 
evolution of religion may have may have been the critical development that first opened 
the door for large-scale cooperative efforts (i.e. civilization) by ensuring universal 
compliance with prevailing social rules and regulations (Alexander, 1987; Atran & 
Norenzayan, 2004; Irons, 1996; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). 
Two Frameworks for Social Regulation 
Two social evolutionary advancements are thought to be primarily responsible for 
religion’s development as a solution to the free rider problem.  The first is a heightened 
tendency to detect agency in nature, which resulted in a pervasive belief in the 
supernatural (Johnson & Bering, 2006; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008).  This predisposition 
to believe in otherworldly agents ostensibly developed as a means for encouraging 
religious affiliation and adherence to a common set of rules and values.  To be sure, 
social regulations enforced via threats of supernatural or divine punishment have a 
number of distinct advantages:  there’s no second-order free rider problem, since the 
agents do the punishing; because group members do not dole out punishment, reprisals 
that might otherwise compromise group integrity are not a concern; and finally, 
transgressors can expect to be automatically caught and punished since they are 
constantly under watch (Johnson & Bering, 2006).  As a result, the social pressures for 
individuals to not lie, cheat, or steal became internalized, and self-regulation became the 
norm. 
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Considerable evidence has been found to support this theory:  Roes and Raymond 
(2002) have found that, across cultures, the belief in morally concerned supernatural 
watchers is positively correlated with group size and cooperation.  People also tend to 
behave more prosocially (i.e. adhere to social rules and expectations) when reminded of 
supernatural agents (Bering, McLeod, & Shackleford, 2005; Shariff & Norenzayan, 
2007) just as they behave more prosocially when they suspect being monitored by other 
humans (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006).  Indeed, this notion that we as a species are 
predisposed to believe in the supernatural is also supported by a number of twin studies 
which indicate that anywhere from 41-55% of variance in religious attitudes are 
attributable to genetic factors (Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken, & Tellegen, 1990; 
Eaves, Eysenck, & Martin, 1989).  Perhaps most impressively, Shariff and Norenzayan 
(2007) have demonstrated that the prosocial priming effects of supernatural stimuli are 
found even among self-professed atheists; that is, even those who do not believe in 
supernatural watchers respond to thinking about their presence. 
The second social evolutionary advancement—an acute sensitivity to reputational 
concerns—serves a very different purpose (Johnson & Bering, 2006; Norenzayan & 
Shariff, 2008).  Having developed prior to—and separately from—religion (Gervais et 
al., 2011; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008), the functional role of this cognitive framework is 
just the opposite of the supernatural aspect:  active enforcement of social regulations via 
informal sanctions (e.g. gossip and shunning).  Prior to the development of religion, as 
group sizes began to increase and informal methods of sanctioning free loaders became 
obsolete, a virtual arms race broke out between honest members of the ingroup, and 
mendacious, free loading interlopers:  as honest members of society got better at spotting 
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liars, liars got better at deceiving others.  Thus, for deterrence to remain an effective 
strategy in ensuring strong reciprocal bonds within group, it was imperative that these 
untrustworthy transgressors be quickly and reliably detected, excluded, and punished for 
their deceit (Henrich, 2006; Irons, 1996; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). 
Muslim Prejudice and The Modern Model 
The modern product of this evolutionary process is perhaps best described as 
systemic religious intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002); that is, favorable 
attitudes towards those who share our beliefs, and biases against those who don’t.  This 
can be further resolved into two distinct components:  1) the supernatural component, 
which is principally prosocial, self-regulatory, and associated with morality and ethics, 
and 2) the categorical component, which is comparatively asocial—at times even 
antisocial—and principally concerned with the instinctive desire to enforce the prevailing 
belief system by detecting, labeling, and excluding value-violators (i.e. religious outgroup 
members) due to their perceived untrustworthiness (Rosik, 2007).  Ultimately, however, 
the cognitive framework underpinning this second component—which initially evolved 
to facilitate and track heuristic assessments of “trustworthiness”—proves to be ill suited 
for making more complex “value compliance” judgments—a fact which becomes 
abundantly clear when one considers the practical application of such a model.   
Take, for instance, an average evangelical’s evaluation of an average Muslim.  
Functionally, the primary goal of the evaluation should be the determination of 
trustworthiness:  recognizing that Islam is a religion, and that religious beliefs equate 
with supernatural watchers (which in turn predict prosocial behavior), the logical 
conclusion—all things being equal—would be that the Muslim is trustworthy.  If, 
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however, the values of the supernatural component are allowed to inform the evaluation, 
errors are almost certain to ensue:  “Because Muslims do not accept Jesus Christ as their 
savior, and doing so is the only true way to ensure salvation, Muslims do not share my 
value system or fear of God, and are thus untrustworthy.” 
Intuitively, were the evangelical to have had previous, positive contact with a 
Muslim, his or her outgroup evaluation may not have been quite so ideological or 
dogmatic.  Absent positive, prior contact with which to inform the heuristic analysis 
however, the default standard is quite often the one provided by ideology.  This logic is 
clearly reflected in a 2006 Gallup poll, which found that personally knowing someone 
who is Muslim corresponds with more favorable attitudes:  50% of respondents who were 
not acquainted with a Muslim responded favorably to the notion of requiring Muslims to 
carry special IDs, compared to 24% of respondents who knew a Muslim—a 26 point 
difference.  Similarly, while 38% of respondents who were unacquainted with a Muslim 
said they would feel nervous being on the same flight as a Muslim, that number dropped 
to 20% among those who did know at least one Muslim—an 18 point difference (Saad, 
2006). 
Consistent with these data are the results of a 2007 Pew Forum Survey, which 
reveals that Islam is the most disliked religion in the United States, with 43% of 
participants reporting favorable attitudes, 35% reporting unfavorable attitudes, and 22% 
expressing no opinion (Lugo, Stencel, Green, & Smith, 2007).  The same survey also 
found substantial age, education, and political affiliation differences in attitudes towards 
Muslims:  older, less educated, and more conservative respondents all reported 
considerably higher levels of anti-Muslim prejudice than did younger, more educated, or 
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more liberal respondents.  Moreover, like the Gallup poll, the Pew survey also found that 
knowing a Muslim matters:  respondents who reported knowing at least one Muslim 
responded more favorably to questions about general opinions towards Muslims, 
likelihood of voting for a Muslim president, degrees of commonality between 
respondents’ religion and Islam, and perceptions of Islam as a violent religion. 
Ideological Intolerance 
Characterized by value-rigidity, social-rigidity, and need for hierarchy, 
ideologically intolerant individuals typically exhibit a simplistic and formulaic 
worldview.  Religious fundamentalists—characterized by the belief that theirs is the one 
true religion, that they have a special relationship with their deity, and that they are 
constantly embattled with the forces of evil (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)—exemplify 
this type of thinking.  According to Rosik (2007), prejudice expressed by fundamentalists 
is often heavily influenced by the “party line” espoused by the religious group they 
affiliate with.  This finding is consistent with the idea that religiously motivated 
prejudices are principally concerned with value violations—a concept which finds further 
support in research conducted by Johnson et al. (2011) indicating that religious 
fundamentalism (RF) mediates the relationship between religion and homosexual 
prejudice, while right-wing authoritarianism mediates the relationship between religion 
and racial prejudice. 
Indeed, the second measure used here to evaluate ideological intolerance is right-
wing authoritarianism (RWA; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; 
Altemeyer, 2003), which, in contrast to RF, is generally more concerned with securing 
against socially threatening outgroups, and ensuring ingroup cohesion and social order 
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(Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002).  A third construct, distinguished here yet 
nonetheless included in these studies is social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which, along with both RF and especially RWA, is 
a well-known prejudice predictor (Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).  SDO is 
differentiated here however, because unlike RF & RWA (Genia, 1996), SDO represents 
non-religious ideological rigidity.  Social dominators are driven by a competitive and 
aggressive need for dominance and superiority over other groups, and to that end, they 
make strategic use of ideologies that most effectively legitimate their superiority 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  Just the opposite, RF and RWA are characterized as dogmatic 
and inflexible with regards to their religious beliefs (LaBouff, 2011), and they 
functionally express prejudice not for aggressive, confrontational purposes, but rather as 
an avoidance-oriented threat response to groups they perceive as socially dangerous 
(Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011).  Nevertheless, 
SDO was included both for exploratory purposes, and due to its high degree of 
association with RF and RWA. 
Ideologically intolerant persons present a unique challenge for contact theory 
given their highly avoidant and highly prejudicial natures:  “When groups are highly 
segregated, physically or socially, or when there is little motivation to engage in contact, 
the benefits of contact may remain unrealized” (Crisp & Turner, 2009, p. 232).  
Fortunately, several methods of indirect contact appear to influence intergroup attitudes 
as well.  According to the extended contact hypothesis, for example, simply knowing that 
an ingroup member has a close and positive relationship with an outgroup member is 
enough to reduce outgroup prejudice and improve intergroup attitudes (Dovidio, Eller, & 
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Hewstone, 2011; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997).  Likewise, imagined 
intergroup contact (Turner et al., 2007)—the mental simulation of a positive social 
interaction with a member of an outgroup—has also proven to be a viable method for 
reducing outgroup bias and improving intergroup relations (Crisp & Turner, 2009).  In 
fact, since its introduction in 2007, imagined intergroup contact has been consistently 
effective at reducing ingroup favoritism (Turner et al., 2007), reducing intergroup anxiety 
(Abrams et al., 2008; Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Turner et al., 2007, Experiments 2 & 3), 
improving outgroup evaluations (Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Turner et al., 2007; Experiments 
2 & 3), improving implicit attitudes (Turner & Crisp, 2010), increasing the liklihood of 
future contact (Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Husnu & Crisp, 2010b; Husnu & Crisp, 2011), 
and more (cf. Crisp, Husnu, Meleady, Stathi, & Turner, 2010). 
The practical implications of these indirect contact theories are tremendous, as 
they allow researchers, policymakers, and educators to initiate contact between groups 
like religious fundamentalists and right-wing authoritarians, who are not only 
predisposed to hate religious and socially threatening outgroups, but also highly unlikely 
to otherwise make contact or benefit from it.  Given that scholars have harbored concerns 
about the efficacy of contact interventions since they were first proposed however, one 
has to wonder:  just how effective can we expect contact to be among ideologically 
intolerance individuals?  While this question has only recently begun to receive empirical 
investigation, initial results appear promising:  a recent literature review considering 
contemporary studies of contact on individuals scoring high in measures of cognitive 
rigidity revealed that intergroup contact (direct and extended) not only works well—but 
often best—among ideologically intolerant and cognitively rigid individuals (Hodson, 
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2011).  How effective imagined intergroup contact might be in such inimical situations 
however is a question that, until now, has yet to be explored. 
 Here, we hypothesize that imagined intergroup contact will improve both explicit 
and implict attitudes, even among ideologically intolerant individuals. 
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Study One 
 Our initial study was designed to replicate and extend previous investigations of 
imagined intergroup contact (e.g. Turner et al., 2007).  Using a between-groups design, 
participants were instructed either to imagine interacting with a Muslim man, or to simply 
think about Muslims.  Dependent variables focused on explicit intergroup attitudes and 
ideological intolerance.  We predicted that positive imagined interaction with an outgroup 
member would improve intergroup attitudes, even among highly fundamentalist and/or 
authoritarian participants. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Seventy-five participants diverse in age (39 men, 46 women, Mage = 30.53 years, 
SD = 10.239, ages 18 to 60) were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1 (MTurk), 
an online crowdsourcing marketplace for human intelligence tasks.  Participants were 
somewhat diverse in both religious affiliation (40% no affiliation, 24% Protestant, 17.3% 
Catholic, 6.7% Buddhist, 2.7% Hindu, 1.3% Jewish, and 8% selected “other”) and 
political orientation (57.3% Liberal, 25.3% Moderate, and 17.3% Conservative) but 
predominantly White (77.3%); other racial and ethnic groups comprised only a minority 
of the sample (9.3% Black, 6.7% Asian / Pacific Islander, 2.7% Hispanic, 2.7% Native 
American, and 1.3% selected “other”).  Eligibility was restricted to MTurk users 18 years 
of age or older with United States-based IP addresses, and respondents were each 
compensated 25¢ for their participation.  Because the target outgroup in the experiment 
                                               
1 https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome  (For a review of MTurk’s validity, see 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gossling, 2011). 
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was Muslims, data from participants who self-identified as Muslim were eliminated prior 
to analysis.
2
 
Materials and Procedure 
The present study was conducted using an online survey, powered by Qualtrics,
3
 
which randomly assigned participants to either an imagined contact condition or a control 
condition.  Participants assigned to the imagined contact condition were asked to:  
“Please spend the next three minutes imagining that you are talking to a Muslim man 
who has sat next to you.  You spend about thirty minutes chatting until you have to leave 
for class.  During the conversation you find out some interesting and unexpected things 
about him.”  Participants were then given three minutes to list as many things as they 
could about their imagined interaction.  Participants assigned to the control condition 
were asked to:  “Please spend the next three minutes thinking about Muslims,” and were 
afterwards given three minutes to list as many thoughts as they could recall having during 
the imagination exercise.  This task allowed us to verify that participants had completed 
the imagery exercise, and at the same time, reinforced its effect (Turner et al., 2007).  
Each page automatically advanced after three minutes elapsed. 
Following the manipulation, participants were asked to complete several 
dependent measures assessing intergroup attitudes and ideological intolerance, as well as 
a series of demographic questions  (Please see Appendix A for the complete 
questionnaire). 
                                               
2
 Although 91 participants completed the survey, 16 were removed during data cleanup.  
Fourteen participants failed to complete the manipulation, one was removed as a 
statistical outlier (>3 SDs from the mean anxiety score), and one participant self-
identified as Muslim. 
3
 http://www.qualtrics.com/ 
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Intergroup Attitudes.  To assess general outgroup attitudes, participants were 
asked to “Please rate how warm or cold you feel toward the following groups” (Muslims, 
Christians, Hindus, Arabic Persons, White Persons, and Black or African American 
Persons) using a single-item thermometer for each group (0° = coldest feelings, 100° = 
warmest feelings).  To evaluate intergroup anxiety, participants were instructed to 
imagine they were being asked to complete a group project with a Muslim partner, and to 
report how “Confident” (reversed), “Irritated,” “Awkward,” “Impatient,” “Frustrated,” 
“Stressed,” “Happy” (reversed), “Self-conscious,” and “Defensive” they felt about the 
upcoming interaction on a 5-point scale (1 = Clearly does not describe my feelings, 5 = 
Clearly describes my feelings; Stephan & Stephan, 1985).  Finally, to assess anti-Muslim 
prejudice, a modified version of Pratto et al.’s (1994) Anti-Arab Racism scale was also 
included.  Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, how positive or negative (1 
= Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive) they felt towards the following statements:  “Most of 
the terrorists in the world today are Muslim,” “Historically, Muslims have made 
important contributions to the world culture” (reversed), “Muslims have little 
appreciation for democratic values,” “People of the Muslim religion tend to be fanatical,” 
and “Muslims value peace and love” (reversed).  Order of the explicit attitude measures 
was randomized for each participant. 
Ideological Intolerance.  Participants then completed three measures of various 
facets of ideological intolerance.  Religious fundamentalism (RF) is the belief that one’s 
religious teaching is uniquely true and inerrant, that the followers of this teaching have a 
special relationship with a deity, and that they are constantly embattled with the forces of 
evil (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).  It was assessed with the 12-item revised religious 
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fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), which is not specific to any 
single world religion.  Participants were asked to rate, on a 9-point scale, how much they 
agreed or disagreed (-4 = Very strongly disagree, 4 = Very strongly agree) with each 
statement (e.g., “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, 
fundamentally true religion”; “All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong 
teachings.  There is no perfectly true, right religion” [reversed]; “The fundamentals of 
God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs”). 
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is composed of three interrelated elements—
submissiveness to legitimate authority, conventionalism, and authoritarian 
aggressiveness—and was measured using Smith and Winter’s (2002) 10-item 
authoritarianism scale.  Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, how much 
they agreed or disagreed (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) with each statement 
(e.g., “There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to 
ruin it for their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action”; “It’s 
better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let the 
government have the power to censor them” [reversed]; “What our country needs most is 
discipline, with everyone following our leader in unity”).  Recent studies conducted by 
Mavor, Macleod, Boal, and Louis (2009) however, indicate that the correlation between 
religious fundamentalism and the conventionalism component of authoritarianism create 
a statistical artifact that distorts the results of multiple regression analyses by suppressing 
the effect of fundamentalism.  To remove this artifact, we used only the aggression and 
submission components in our analyses. 
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For exploratory purposes, we also included a measure of social dominance 
orientation (SDO), an indicator of a personal preference for hierarchy within social 
systems, which was measured using the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Prato et al., 
1994).  Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, how positive or negative (1 = 
Very negative, 7 = Very positive) they felt toward 14 items (e.g. “Some people are just 
inferior to others,” “Increased social equality” [reversed], “This country would be better 
off if we cared less about how equal all people were”). 
Presentation of the ideological intolerance measures was randomized for each 
participant. 
Results 
 As expected, ideological intolerance positively correlated with self-reported 
measures of anti-Muslim prejudice, intergroup anxiety, religiosity, and conservative 
political orientation (Please see Table 1 for descriptives and correlations). 
To further investigate the effects of imagined interaction on outgroup attitudes, 
we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) which revealed a significant effect:  
participants reported significantly less anti-Muslim prejudice in the imagined interaction 
condition (M = 2.46, SD = 1.24) than participants in the control condition (M = 3.38, SD 
= 1.47), F(1,72) = 8.07, p = .006.  Likewise, participants in the imagined interaction 
condition reported significantly less intergroup anxiety (M = 1.80, SD = 0.621) than those 
in the control condition (M = 2.49, SD = 0.91), F(1,72) = 12.78, p = .001 (Please see 
Table 2). 
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 To assess the unique contributions of both the dispositional personality predictors 
and the manipulation, we conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for both anti-
Muslim prejudice and intergroup anxiety.  These analyses revealed that contact explains 
unique variability in both anxiety [F(1,65) = 12.25, p = .001] and anti-Muslim prejudice 
[F(1,65) = 5.51, p = .022] when simultaneously controlling for measures of ideological 
intolerance.  Moreover, in a second set of ANCOVAs, imagined intergroup contact 
continued to account for unique variability in anxiety—though not anti-Muslim 
prejudice—even when simultaneously controlling for religious fundamentalism, right-
wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation (Please see Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVAs for Ideological Intolerance and Intergroup 
Attitudes by Condition 
Attitude Variable 
 
Imagined 
Intergroup 
Contact 
 
Control Condition 
  
    
 M SD  M SD F p 
Anti-Muslim 
Prejudice 
 
2.46 1.24  3.38 1.47 8.07 .006** 
Anxiety 
 
1.80 .62  2.48 .91 12.78 .001** 
RF 
 
-2.11 2.06  -1.12 2.26 3.66 .060 
RWA 
 
2.72 1.30  3.13 1.51 1.49 .226 
SDO 
 
2.92 .38  3.38 .63 12.86 .001** 
Note:  RF = Religious Fundamentalism RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism, and 
SDO = Social Dominance Orientation.  * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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A multiple regression analysis revealed that none of the ideological intolerance variables 
moderated the relationship between imagined contact and explicit attitudes towards 
Muslims (Fs ranged from 0.57 to 1.37, ns). 
Discussion 
 The data presented here clearly support our hypotheses that positive imagined 
interactions with outgroup members may reduce outgroup prejudices and intergroup 
anxiety, even among the ideologically intolerant.  While these results are certainly 
compelling, the failure of the manipulation to explain unique variability in anti-Muslim 
prejudice (when also controlling for SDO) raises an interesting question:  Was imagined 
intergroup contact simply ineffective at reducing outgroup prejudice, or is some other 
factor responsible for the inconsistency?  While this is certainly a possibility, an 
alternative explanation—given that values approached the floor in the experimental 
group—could be that anti-Muslim prejudice was already so low prior to the manipulation 
that there was little room left for improvement (Hodson, 2011).  On the other hand, 
changes in attitude may have been significant, but undetectable due to the between-
groups design.  To address this limitation and observe changes in attitudes within 
participants, a repeated measures design was required. 
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Study Two 
 In Study 1 we demonstrated that imagined intergroup contact reduces outgroup 
prejudice and intergroup anxiety—relative to a control condition—even among 
ideologically intolerant individuals.  Lacking pretest scores however, we could not 
definitively conclude that imagined contact improved individuals’ attitudes towards 
Muslims.  Thus, in Study 2 we aimed to replicate and extend these findings using a 
repeated measures within subjects design.  By entering pre-existing attitudes as covariates 
in the analyses, we were better able to examine the hypothesis that imagining a positive 
interaction with an outgroup member reduces intergroup anxiety and outgroup prejudice. 
Study 2 also investigated the relationship between imagined contact and implicit 
attitudes.  Unlike explicit attitudes—which are conscious, overt, deliberative, and 
commonly assessed with self-report measures—implicit attitudes are relatively more 
difficult to evaluate due to their covert, involuntary, non-verbal nature (Turner & Crisp, 
2010; McConnell & Leibold, 2001).  Given that implicit attitudes are not only more 
difficult to mask (Turner & Crisp, 2010), but also more resistant to change (Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), a significant effect of imagined contact on implicit outgroup 
prejudice among ideologically intolerant individuals would substantially enhance its 
appeal as a prejudice-reduction technique.  Encouraged by Turner and Crisp’s (2010) 
recent findings demonstrating imagined contact’s efficacy in improving intergroup 
attitudes, we included a measure of implicit prejudice in hopes of replicating their results 
among ideologically intolerant participants. 
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Methods 
Participants 
 Eighty-nine undergraduate students (29 men, 60 women, Mage = 19.51 years, SD = 
2.638) were recruited from the psychology department’s participant pool at the 
University of Maine.  Thirty-eight additional students (16 men, 22 women, Mage = 19.24 
years, SD = 1.149) who scored in the top tertile on aggregate measures of right-wing 
authoritarianism or religious fundamentalism in the participant pool pre-screen were also 
recruited by email.  Participants were somewhat diverse with regards to religious 
affiliation (29.1% Catholic, 28.3% no affiliation, 28.3% Protestant, 3.1% Buddhist, 2.4% 
Jewish, 0.8% Hindu, and 7.9% selected “other”) but predominantly White (86.6%); other 
racial and ethnic groups comprised only a minority of the sample (5.5% Asian / Pacific 
Islander, 3.9% Native American, 1.6% Black, 0.8% Hispanic, and 0.8% selected “other”).  
The prescreen was administered by the University of Maine’s Department of Psychology 
in January 2012.  Participants were recruited and completed posttest measures between 
January 1 and March 15, 2012.  Participants received one hour of research credit for their 
participation.  As in the first study, data from participants who self-identified as Muslim 
were eliminated prior to analysis.
4
 
Materials and Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to Study 1 except in the following ways.  Participants 
completed a prescreen prior to the study, which allowed us to control for preexisting 
attitudes by using their prescreen scores as covariates during data analysis.  In addition to 
                                               
4
 Although 133 participants completed the survey, six were removed during data cleanup.  
Four participants failed to complete the manipulation, one was removed as a statistical 
outlier (>3 SDs from the mean anxiety score), and one participant self-identified as 
Muslim. 
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explicit attitudes and ideological intolerance measures, we also included a measure of 
implicit attitudes. 
Implicit Attitudes.  To investigate implicit attitudes towards Muslims we used a 
modified version of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), adapted to evaluate attitudes towards Muslims relative to Christians, utilizing the 
relatively low-tech IAT approach suggested by Lemm, Lane, Sattler, Kahn, and Nosek 
(2008).   
While both methods operate on the fundamental assumption that faster responses 
reflect closer associations between concepts, the conventional IAT measures the length of 
time it takes a participant to sort a fixed number of items (Greenwald et al., 1998), while 
the short-form IAT instead tests how many items a participant can sort within a fixed 
amount of time (Greenwald et al., 1998; Lemm et al., 2008).  Implicit attitudes were 
measured using identifiably Christian (Jesus, Church, Bible, Christian, and Gospel) or 
Muslim (Muhammad, Islam, Mosque, Muslim, and Koran) target stimuli, and identifiably 
pleasant (good, love, terrific, joy, and happy) or unpleasant (hatred, poison, evil, vomit, 
and bad) attribute stimuli.   
In one example block and two counterbalanced critical blocks, students were 
asked to sort stimuli appearing along the left side of the page into one of two columns 
marked by specific category pairings (Muslim–Unpleasant/Christian–Pleasant in the 
congruent block, and Muslim–Pleasant/Christian–Unpleasant in the incongruent block).  
Participants had 30 seconds in each of the critical blocks to quickly categorize as many of 
the 40 stimuli as possible by clicking the button in the appropriate column for each 
stimulus (e.g. clicking Muslim—Pleasant for Mosque or terrific).  Responses were scored 
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and analyzed using the “product: square root of difference” approach, wherein the square 
root of the difference between the number of items correctly categorized between the two 
blocks is multiplied by the ratio of items successfully categorized (Lemm et al., 2008).  
Consistent with previous research, faster associations of Muslim—Unpleasant, compared 
to Muslim—Pleasant, were interpreted as implicit anti-Muslim prejudices (Rowatt, 
Franklin, & Cotton, 2005).  The short-form IAT was always the first posttest measure 
presented, and each page automatically advanced after the given time elapsed (Please see 
Appendix F for an example block). 
Results 
 Consistent with our first study, ideological intolerance positively correlated with 
self-reported measures of anti-Muslim prejudice, intergroup anxiety, religiosity, and 
conservatism, as did pretest scores and the implicit attitude measure.  In fact, scores on 
the newly adapted online short-form IAT consistently correlated with both pretest and 
posttest measures of ideological intolerance and anti-Muslim prejudice (Please see Table 
5 for descriptives and correlations).  However, an analysis of covariance using measures 
of ideological intolerance as covariates revealed only marginally significant differences 
between experimental and control conditions on implicit attitudes towards Muslims, as 
assessed by the new short-form IAT (Please see Table 6).   
To determine if the manipulation was successful in improving individual 
participants’ explicit intergroup attitudes, we conducted analyses of covariance for both 
anti-Muslim prejudice and intergroup anxiety using participants’ pretest scores as 
covariates.  These analyses revealed that condition explained unique variability in anti-
Muslim prejudice [F(1,93) = 8.53, p = .004, partial eta
2
 = .084] but not intergroup 
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anxiety [F(1,91) = 1.08, p = .303] when simultaneously controlling for preexisting 
attitudes and ideological intolerance (Please see Tables 7 and 8).   
As in the previous study, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to 
determine if the effects of the imagined interaction were mediated by ideological 
intolerance.  None of the variables used to measure ideological intolerance were found to 
moderate the relationship between imagined intergroup contact and explicit attitudes 
towards Muslims (Fs ranged from 0.01 to 3.22, ns). 
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Discussion 
 The significant and consistent correlation between implicit Muslim prejudice and 
the self-reported measures of explicit anti-Muslim prejudice and ideological intolerance 
is compelling evidence of the measure’s validity.  Imagined intergroup contact’s inability 
to reduce intergroup anxiety is inconsistent with our hypotheses, our previous study, and 
previous research that has shown that anxiety mediates the bias-reducing effects of 
imagined intergroup contact (Turner et al., 2007).  One possible explanation, given the 
high levels of variance observed in the self-reported anxiety measure, is that a larger 
sample size is required for a sufficiently precise assessment. 
Nevertheless, imagined contact’s ability to explain unique variability in anti-
Muslim prejudices—even when simultaneously controlling for preexisting attitudes, 
right-wing authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and social dominance 
orientation—supports our hypothesis that merely imagining a positive interaction with an 
outgroup member can improve intergroup attitudes, even among the ideologically 
intolerant. 
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General Discussion 
 Consistent with our original hypothesis, we found across two studies that 
imagined intergroup contact is effective in improving outgroup attitudes, even among 
ideologically intolerant individuals.  In Study 1, we demonstrated imagined contact’s 
efficacy relative to a control condition using a national sample in a between groups 
design.  In Study 2, we replicated those findings, and extended them using a repeated 
measures within subjects design to confirm that imagined contact could improve 
individuals’ attitudes towards Muslims. 
To the best of our knowledge, Study 2 marks the inaugural, promising debut of 
the online short-form IAT measure.  Though we were unable to replicate the significant 
effect achieved by Turner and Crisp (2010), a correlational analysis did reveal a negative 
relationship between imagined intergroup contact and implicit prejudice towards 
Muslims.  Given the intractability of implicit attitudes and the novelty of the measure, we 
find these results encouraging, and worthy of additional research. 
 Although Study 2 failed to replicate the anxiety reduction effects demonstrated in 
previous research (Abrams et al., 2008; Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Turner et al., 2007), self-
reported levels of intergroup anxiety nearly bottomed out in Study 1 (M = 1.80, SD = 
0.621), revealing a large effect size (eta
2
 = 0.151).  Given the high degree of success 
observed in the first study, the high degree of variance observed in the second study, and 
previous research indicating a mediational role of intergroup anxiety, the discrepancy 
may simply reflect interference from the short-form IAT. 
These data are largely consistent with a recent study conducted by Asbrock et al. 
(2012), which revealed that social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism 
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differentially predict the effects of intergroup contact on prejudicial attitudes.  However, 
where Asbrock et al. (2012) found direct intergroup contact beneficial for right-wing 
authoritarians but not social dominators, the present study reveals a significant effect of 
imagined intergroup contact even when controlling for social dominance orientation.  
This may be the first time imagined intergroup contact has been shown to have an 
advantage of efficacy and opportunity over direct intergroup contact. 
Though they have not been operationalized or coded, participants’ reflections on 
their experience (which we used as a manipulation check) to both the imagined 
interaction (first two reflections) and control condition (second two reflections) are also 
revealing:   
 
o He was older, around 50.  He had black hair, that was slicked back. His laugh 
was low, more like a hard chuckle. We talked about soccer, which he loved to 
play as a child. He came to the states to help his family. We then discussed my 
family and our traditons. Our families seemed very similar except for our dads. 
My dad sounded to be more [ends] 
o We were sitting in the north pod of the union. He was wearing a turban and had 
darker skin then I do. The things that we had in common were that we both lived 
in the same dorm, we both played basketball, we had the same major, and we 
were taking similar casses. It seemed that our conversation was a friendly one. 
He had a bit of an accent. 
 Muslims are a very different culture from our own.  They dress very differently, 
and therefore are rightfully deserving of the term "towel head."  They are also 
responsible for many terrorist attacks that have happened in the recent past.  I 
have little ue for these extremist people. They are not good for much else besides 
building bombs and taking our jobs away. 
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 People associate them with terrorists. My father is racist of musslims. I think 
muslims are just people like you and me. There are bad muslims and good 
muslims just like there are bad christians and good christians. I don't agree with 
most of the muslims eliefs. I have nothing against muslims personally. I have met 
musslims and thought they were nice people. I have also met some unfriendly 
muslims who thought they were superior than I. Just because my father hates 
muslims doesn't mean I have to. My s [ends] 
 
These responses from Study 2 illustrate a common theme among respondents 
from both samples:  the conflation of “Muslim” and “Arab.”  Though neither of the two 
prompts mentioned race or country of origin, many responses to the manipulation check 
referenced language barriers or the Middle East.  If the conflation of these two mental 
constructs triggers both RWA (social structure and security) and RF (value-violation) 
style threat, it may help explain why anti-Muslim prejudice is so strong. 
Limitations 
 Though our research provides compelling evidence to support the efficacy of 
imagined intergroup contact among highly ideologically intolerant and cognitively rigid 
individuals, it does have a number of limitations.   
Although sampling from two different populations—one local and one national—
strengthened the external validity of our findings, our samples from both populations 
were predominantly White, and either Christian or non-religiously affiliated.  To an 
extent however, this was unavoidable, as a more diverse population would have likely 
resulted in higher levels of prior real contact with Muslims, and thus fewer ideologically 
intolerant individuals (Hodson, 2011).  To provide further validity, future research should 
be conducted using a more diverse sample.   
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While our initial study suffered from a lack of pretest scores and an unequal 
distribution of participant error across condition, leading to slightly disproportionate cell 
sizes (44 participants in the control condition versus 31 participants in the experimental 
condition), both of these limitations were addressed in Study 2.  Neither study, however, 
collected information about prior actual contact with Muslims, which would have 
allowed us to determine if prior contact was correlated with lower initial levels of 
intergroup prejudice. 
Lastly, while our control condition has been successfully used in previous 
research (Turner et al., 2007; Turner & Crisp, 2010) to ensure that results reflect 
imagined intergroup contact, rather than simple stereotype/outgroup priming, additional 
control conditions would have further strengthened our findings.  Moreover, given our 
focus on ideologically intolerant individuals, it is possible that the control task 
exacerbated existing prejudices.  To rule out this possibility, additional research should 
be conducted using alternative control conditions such as no-contact control scenes 
(Abrams et al., 2008; Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Turner et al., 2007), and nonrelevant positive 
interaction (Stathi & Crisp, 2008).  Similarly, future research should be conducted using a 
wide array of dependent variables including self-reports (e.g. explicit attitudes, likelihood 
of future contact, outgroup variability), IATs, behavioral measures (e.g. resource 
distribution games), and physiological measures (e.g. mean arterial pressure, galvanic 
skin response, etc.). 
Applications and Concluding Remarks 
While the ameliorative effects of direct intergroup contact are myriad and well 
documented, they are not without significant limitations.  As Asbrock et al. (2012) 
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demonstrated, direct intergroup contact continues to face issues of efficacy and 
opportunity:  “SDO prevents engagement in intergroup contact as well as shielding one 
from an improvement of outgroup attitudes after contact experiences” (p. 886-887). 
The present studies address both of these limitations.  Here, we have shown 
imagined intergroup contact to be effective among ideologically intolerant and 
cognitively rigid individuals in ways that even direct intergroup contact is not.  Indeed, 
because it requires no actual outgroup contact experience—either direct or extended—
imagined contact is practically applicable even when groups are highly segregated with 
little to no motivation for interaction. 
However, we do not believe this qualifies it as a suitable replacement for existing 
methods of contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009).  On the contrary, we believe imagined 
intergroup contact is most effective as an intervention technique when used in concert 
with other forms of contact.  In a diplomatic context—peace talks between Israel and 
Palestine, or North and South Korea for example—imagined intergroup contact, if 
applied repeatedly and consistently leading up to a summit, may encourage, facilitate, 
and enhance direct contact by reducing perceived outgroup threat.  Alternatively, in an 
educational context, imagined intergroup contact may be helpful in alleviating issues of 
racism, homophobia, and religious discrimination if elements were incorporated into 
assigned writing prompts.  Finally, the present data also suggest that imagined intergroup 
contact may prove to be an invaluable tool for researchers seeking to further delineate the 
effects of individual difference variables (i.e. right-wing authoritarianism, religious 
fundamentalism, and social dominance orientation) on the relationship between contact, 
religion, and prejudice. 
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Appendix A – Experimetrix Recruitment Statement 
 
Experimetrix Recruitment Statement: 
 
Title – An Imagination Exercise 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study on imagined interactions and 
interpersonal attitudes.  If you agree to participate, you will be asked to imagine or think 
about a specific scenario.  After you complete the imagination exercise, you will be asked 
several questions about your attitudes and opinions.   
 
This task requires your undivided attention for up to half an hour.  Please make sure you 
only begin this experiment if you are over 18 and are willing and able to provide that 
attention. 
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Appendix B—Recruitment Email 
Recruitment E-mail 
 
SUBJECT: A Study of Imagined Interaction 
 
Hello, 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Charles 
Bergeron, an undergraduate Psychology–Honors student, and Jordan LaBouff, a College 
of Liberal Arts and Sciences–Honors Preceptor of Psychology, at the University of 
Maine.  The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between interpersonal 
experiences and attitudes towards others.  
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to perform a simple, five-minute 
imaginative exercise before answering a number of questions about yourself, your 
attitudes, and your beliefs.  The study will take approximately 30 minutes to complete, 
and you will receive one hour of research credit as compensation. 
 
For more information, or to complete the survey, please click the link below. 
 
Survey Link 
 
Thank you in advance for your assistance, 
 
Charles Bergeron 
Jordan LaBouff, PhD 
Department of Psychology 
University of Maine, Orono 
charles.bergeron@umit.maine.edu 
jordan.laBouff@umit.maine.edu 
207-581-2826
 49 
 
Appendix C—UMaine Students’ Informed Consent 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Charles Bergeron, 
an undergraduate Psychology–Honors student, and Jordan LaBouff, a College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences–Honors Preceptor of Psychology at the University of Maine.  The purpose of this study 
is to investigate the relationship between interpersonal experiences and attitudes towards others.   
 
You must be 18 or older to participate 
 
What Will You Be Asked To Do? 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to perform a simple, five-minute imaginative 
exercise before answering a number of questions about yourself, your attitudes, and your beliefs.  
It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete this study. 
 
Risks 
It is possible that some questions will make you uncomfortable.  You may skip any questions that 
you do not feel comfortable answering, and you may terminate participation at any time. 
 
Benefits 
While there are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study, your participation will 
help enhance our understanding of the ways in which our personal experiences shape our attitudes 
towards others.   
 
Compensation 
You will receive one hour of research credit as compensation for your participation in this 
experiment. 
 
Voluntary 
Participation is voluntary.  You may terminate participation at any time without loss of credit.   
 
Confidentiality 
No identifying information will be collected.  Anonymous data will be kept indefinitely on a 
password-protected drive in a locked laboratory or office. 
 
Contact Information 
If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact Charles Bergeron—a fifth-
year Psychology Honors student pursuing dual bachelor’s degrees in Psychology and Political 
Science—or Jordan LaBouff on FirstClass (Charles.Bergeron@umit.maine.edu 
Jordan.LaBouff@umit.maine.edu).  Additionally, if you have any questions about your rights as a 
research participant, please contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection 
of Human Subjects Review Board, at 207-581-1498 (or e-mail gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu).  
 
“By clicking this link I give my consent to participate in this study.  Let’s get started” 
 
“I DO NOT consent to this study and would like to leave this website” 
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Appendix D—MTurk Recruitment Statement 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Charles 
Bergeron, an undergraduate Psychology–Honors student, and Jordan LaBouff, a College of 
Liberal Arts and Sciences–Honors Preceptor of Psychology at the University of Maine.  The 
purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between interpersonal experiences and 
attitudes towards others.   
 
You must be 18 or older to participate 
 
What Will You Be Asked To Do? 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to perform a simple, five-minute imaginative 
exercise before answering a number of questions about yourself, your attitudes, and your 
beliefs.  It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete this study. 
 
Risks 
It is possible that some questions will make you uncomfortable.  You may skip any questions 
that you do not feel comfortable answering, and you may terminate participation at any time. 
 
Benefits 
While there are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study, your participation 
will help enhance our understanding of the ways in which our personal experiences shape our 
attitudes towards others.   
 
Compensation 
You will receive $.25 as compensation for your participation in this experiment. 
 
Voluntary 
Participation is voluntary.  You may terminate participation at any time without loss of 
payment.   
 
Confidentiality 
No identifying information will be collected.  Anonymous data will be kept indefinitely on a 
password-protected drive in a locked laboratory or office. 
 
Contact Information 
If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact Charles Bergeron or 
Jordan LaBouff (Charles.Bergeron@umit.maine.edu; Jordan.LaBouff@umit.maine.edu).  
Additionally, if you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection of Human Subjects 
Review Board, at 207-581-1498 (or e-mail gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu).  
 
“By clicking this link I give my consent to participate in this study.  Let’s get started” 
 
“I DO NOT consent to this study and would like to leave this website.” 
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Appendix E—Questionnaires 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS: 
Sex: 
 Male 
 Female 
  
Please type your age (in years) in the space provided:  _____ 
 
With what racial/ethnic group do you most closely identify?  (Choose one): 
 African American / Black 
 Asian / Pacific Islander 
 Hispanic 
 Native American 
 White 
 Another race/ethnicity (please specify):  _______________ 
 
In what socio-economic bracket were you raised for most of your life? 
 Upper class 
 Upper-middle class 
 Middle class 
 Lower-middle class 
 Lower class 
 
In what type of area were you raised for most of your life?  
 A large city 
 A suburb near a large city 
 A small city or town 
 A rural area 
 I don't know 
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In what type of area are you currently living? 
 A large city 
 A suburb near a large city 
 A small city or town 
 A rural area 
 I don't know 
  
Do you believe in God? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Uncertain 
  
What is your primary religious affiliation? 
  
 Protestant 
  
 Catholic 
  
 Buddhist 
  
 Hindu 
  
 Jewish 
  
 Muslim 
  
 None 
  
 Other religion (please specify):  _______________  
  
How interested are you in religion? 
1 - Not at all 
interested 2 3 4 
5 - 
Moderately 
interested 6 7 8 
9 - 
Extremely 
interested 
                  
  
To what extent do you consider yourself a RELIGIOUS person? 
1 - Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Very much 
              
  
To what extent do you consider yourself a SPIRITUAL person? 
1 - Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Very much 
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How would you describe yourself politically? 
 Very Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Leaning Conservative 
 Moderate 
 Leaning Liberal 
 Liberal 
 Very Liberal 
  
What is your sexual orientation? 
 Heterosexual 
 Homosexual 
 Bisexual 
  
How many other people are in the same room where you are completing this 
survey? 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5+ 
  
What other tasks are you doing while you complete this survey (choose ALL that 
apply)? 
 Nothing - only completing this survey 
 Watching TV 
 Listening to music 
 Talking with friends 
 Reading something else (besides this survey) 
 Eating 
 Other (please specify):  _______________  
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RIGHT WING AUTHORITARIANISM (Smith & Winter, 2002) 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions according to how much you 
agree or disagree with each statement.  You will probably find that you agree with 
some of the statements and disagree with others, to varying extents. 
  
What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 -Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
Once our government leaders give us the “go-ahead,” it will be the duty of every patriotic 
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create 
doubts in people’s minds. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
 
It’s better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let 
the government have the power to censor them. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leader in unity. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
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Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 -Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
People should pay less attention to the Bible and other old traditional forms of religious 
guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
  
There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
1 - Strongly 
disagree 
2 - Moderately 
disagree 
3 - Slightly 
disagree 4 - Neutral 
5 - Slightly 
agree 
6 - Moderately 
agree 
7 - Strongly 
agree 
              
 
 
REVISED RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM SCALE (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) 
 
God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must 
be totally followed. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about 
life. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
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The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is constantly and ferociously fighting 
against God. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t go 
any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the 
Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, 
literally true from beginning to end. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true 
religion. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
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“Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses.  There really is no such 
thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with 
others’ beliefs. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
                  
 
  
All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings.  There is no perfectly true, 
right religion. 
-4 Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
-3 Strongly 
Disagree 
-2 
Moderately 
Disagree 
-1 Slightly 
Disagree 0 Neutral 
1 Slightly 
Agree 
2 
Moderately 
Agree 
3 Strongly 
Agree 
4 Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
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SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION (Prato, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) 
Instructions:  Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or 
negative feeling towards?  Beside each object or statement, choose a number from “1” to 
“7” which represents the degree of your positive or negative feeling. 
 
   
1 - Very 
negative 
2 - 
Negative 
3 - 
Slightly 
negative 
4 - 
Neither 
positive 
nor 
negative 
5 - 
Slightly 
positive 
6 - 
Positive 
7 - Very 
positive 
Some groups of people are simply 
not the equals of others.                 
Equality. 
                
It is important that we treat other 
countries as equals.                 
This country would be better off if 
we cared less about how equal all 
people were. 
                
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
necessary to step on others.                 
In an ideal world, all nations would 
be equal.                 
Increased social equality. 
                
If people were treated more equally 
we would have fewer problems in 
this country. 
                
It is not a problem if some people 
have more of a chance in life than 
others. 
                
We should try to treat one another as 
equals as much as possible.  (All 
humans should be treated equally). 
                
Some people are just more worthy 
than others.                 
Increased economic quality. 
                
Some people are just inferior to 
others.                 
Some people are just more deserving 
than others.                 
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ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDE ITEMS 
Please rate how warm or cold you feel toward the following groups (0° coldest feelings, 50° neutral 
feelings, 100° warmest feelings): 
 
 
 
0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° 
Muslims 
                      
  
Arabic 
persons                       
  
 
Instructions:  Which of the following statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards?  
For each statement, mark a number from “1” to “7” which represents the degree of your positive or 
negative feeling.  Remember, your first reaction is best.  Work as quickly as you can. 
   
Very 
Negative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
Positive 
7 
Most of the terrorists in the world today are 
Muslims.                 
Historically, Muslims have made important 
contributions to the world culture.                 
Muslims have little appreciation for democratic 
values.                 
People of the Muslim religion tend to be fanatical. 
                
Muslims value peace and love. 
                
 
INTERGROUP ANXIETY – Adapted from Stephan and Stephan, 1985 
Imagine that you will be asked to complete a group project with a Muslim partner.  Please indicate 
the extent to which you feel the emotions below in anticipating your interactions with this partner. 
   
Clearly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
Mostly does 
not describe 
my feelings 
Somewhat 
describes my 
feelings 
Mostly 
describes my 
feelings 
Clearly 
describes my 
feelings 
Confident 
            
Irritated 
            
Awkward 
            
Impatient 
            
Frustrated 
            
Stressed 
            
Happy 
            
Self-conscious 
            
Defensive 
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Appendix F 
 
On the next page, you will find a table like the one below with different categories.  You will 
have 30 seconds to correctly categorize as many terms as possible (on the left side of the 
page) by clicking the button under the proper category.  After 30 seconds, the survey will 
automatically advance to the next page.  Please work as quickly and accurately as possible, 
categorizing each item before moving on to the next. 
  
If you understand and are ready to proceed, please click below. 
 
 
 
 
 
FLOWER - PLEASANT / INSECT - 
UNPLEASANT 
   
Flower 
Pleasant 
Insect 
Unpleasant  
Rose 
       
Poison 
       
Ant 
       
Good 
       
Daffodil 
       
Love 
       
Mosquito 
       
Anger 
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